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PREFACE 
 
 
The chapters in this book were written at a time of significant, rapid 
change in Ethiopia. Some issues that have emerged during this period of 
transition – such as mass displacements of people, rising ethnic conflict and 
a rise in the illegal trade of weapons – are not featured. Keeping track of 
these developments requires a different form of publishing, which operates 
on a much shorter timeline (e.g., Cochrane and Zewde, 2019; Cochrane and 
Mandefro, 2019; Cochrane and Kefale, 2019). We had initially envisioned 
that this edited volume would include a section on economic issues, but did 
not receive submissions in that area. Fortunately, Cheru, Cramer and 
Oqubay (2019) have recently published The Oxford Handbook of the 
Ethiopian Economy, which readers can refer to for coverage of economic 
issues. 
I vividly remember a conversation I had with Zerihun Mohammed and 
Asnake Kefale in early 2018. The future of Ethiopia looked bleak. Civil war 
seemed possible. Around that same time period, I had written that new ways 
of governance might be unrealistic (Dejene and Cochrane, 2018). The 
collection of chapters in this book focus on challenges; ones that largely 
preceded the changes in 2018 and 2019 as well as ones that will continue 
into the future. It is, however, worth noting the positive changes that have 
taken place: peace with Eritrea, the release of political prisoners and 
journalists, the return of opposition parties to the country and to political life, 
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representative appointments of gender and regions in positions of political 
power, a clamp down on corruption, a plan for free and fair elections in 2020. 
Alongside those changes, new challenges have emerged as well. Many of 
these changes occurred after much of the research presented in this book was 
undertaken, and as a result these changes are not covered in depth. 
This book is presented in four sections, respectively covering issues 
related to governance, health, gender and land. Several chapters cross 
multiple thematic areas. Many of these chapters present original research 
and raise important questions. Not all of the chapters present answers; that 
was not the objective per se. Many do, however, present potential options 
and pathways through which the identified issues might be engaged with in 
the months and years to come. None of the issues are simple, none can be 
addressed with a top-down technical approach. If anything, this collection 
highlight the complexity of the challenges being encountered in Ethiopia. 
Given the uncertainities that exist amidst this period of transition, the people 
and government of Ethiopia have little room for miscalculation. It is hoped 
that this collection supports the generation of new ideas, perspectives, and 
potentially priorities. 
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Chapter 1
FREEDOM OF MOBILITY IN 
AN ETHNIC-BASED FEDERAL STRUCTURE:
THE ETHIOPIAN QUANDARY
Abdissa Zerai
Department of Communication and Journalism,  
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, US 
ABSTRACT
The Ethiopian experiment with ethnic-based federal system is 
arguably precipitated by historical grievances that the various ethnic 
communities had with successive Ethiopian regimes. However, the system 
that has been put in place to address such historical ills is producing serious 
impediments for the free mobility of citizens within and across state lines 
and thereby posing a threat to peaceful coexistence. This chapter is an 
attempt to provide theoretically and contextually grounded analysis 
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attributing the current crisis partly to the constitutional adoption of 
contradictory conceptions of freedom of mobility and the attendant land 
ownership rights. 
 
Keywords: freedom of mobility, land ownership, liberalism, ethno-
nationalism, securitization, boundary- maintenance, social closure, 
urban-industrial society, agrarian society 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the emergence of modern Ethiopia as a nation-state, its political 
history has been punctuated by conflicts with varying degree of intensity, 
ranging from passive resistance to violent confrontations. Successive 
regimes, up until 1991, tried to suppress the unique cultural identities of the 
country’s more than eighty distinct ethno-linguistic groups and at the same 
time tried to assimilate them into the dominant culture (Keller & Smith 
2005). In doing so, these regimes singularly focused on building a highly 
centralized unitary state and did not see it fit to accommodate the demands 
of the various ethnic groups for autonomy or self-governance. 
Explaining why the regimes in pre-1991 era had turned deaf ear to the 
notion of autonomy under some form of federalism, Kymlicka (2006) notes 
that security fears played an important role in the resistance to federalism 
during these periods. One worry was that the ethnic Somalis were more loyal 
to Somalia than to Ethiopia, and would collaborate with a possible Somali 
invasion. Another worry was that Egypt was supporting various minority 
insurgencies, particularly amongst Islamic minorities, as part of the goal of 
creating a pan-Arabic and/or pan-Islamic hegemony in the Horn and Red 
Sea area. More generally, Ethiopia had often seen itself as surrounded by 
potential enemies, and worried about the extent to which its minorities 
would be loyal in the event of war with its neighbors. According to Kymlicka 
(2006), these are almost textbook examples of the ‘securitization’ of state-
minority relations, and history suggests that states almost never accept 
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multination federalism under these conditions, except as a result of violent 
insurgency or international pressure.  
From the outset, Emperor Haile Selassie and the ruling elite vigorously 
pursued an assimilatinist nation-building process (that had been initiated by 
Emperor Menilik) by using the Amharic language and Orthodox 
Christianity, among others, as an instrument to forge a common Ethiopian 
identity (Keller 1981; Messay 2019). Regardless, the emperor cultivated 
both at home and abroad a myth that Ethiopia was a multi-ethnic but unitary 
nation-state.  
However, by the early 1970s, Ethiopia’s poverty, gross inequalities, 
political and economic underdevelopment laid bare the lack of a foundation 
for such a myth (Keller & Smith 2005). This phenomenon led to protests and 
violence that ended the reign of the Monarchy and brought about the military 
dictatorship of Mengistu H/Mariam in early 1970s. But before looking at the 
era of the military regime, it is important to briefly touch upon the 
international and geopolitical context of the time and how such a context had 
shaped the nature of political struggle in Ethiopia.  
Due to the changing international environment following the end of the 
Second World War, the subsequent decolonization movement set in motion 
in the Third World, and the Cold War ideological divide that structured the 
world into two contending camps, the political struggle in Ethiopia took on 
a new dimension. Armed with new theoretical and conceptual tools derived 
from Marxism and Leninism, the emerging Ethiopian intelligentsia started 
articulating the nature of Ethiopia’s problem. Although the Ethiopian 
intelligentsia of the time invariably shared the existence of oppression, 
exploitation and marginalization of the Ethiopian masses, they differed on 
defining the nature of such oppression, exploitation and marginalization. 
While some of them wished to articulate the problem in terms of class, some 
others, such as the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Party (EPRP), were 
keen to define the problem largely from the national perspective, i.e., taking 
the “national question” as the primary analytical category. The “national 
question” was conceived as the existence of national oppression and the need 
for bringing an end to such oppression by ensuring national self-
determination for the various ethnic groups constituting the Ethiopian state. 
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The disagreements among the Ethiopian intelligentsia on the nature of 
Ethiopia’s problem later proved consequential. Unable to narrow their 
differences, the cohort turned against each other. The military took 
advantage of the chaotic situation and seized power. After brutally 
decimating its rivals, the military junta consolidated its power. Less than two 
years after the overthrow of the monarchy, the new leaders committed 
themselves to scientific socialism and proceeded to reorganize society to 
achieve this end. One of the defining features of Ethiopia’s brand of 
scientific socialism was the illegitimacy of ethnicity as a political organizing 
principle (the military regime shared the concerns of the Monarchy’s 
‘securitization’ of state-minority relations, i.e., the fear that minorities may 
not be loyal to the state in case of war with neighboring states). Instead, the 
ruling regime of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam thought it best to group 
the public into mass organizations on the basis of their economic or social 
roles. In doing this, the Mengistu regime failed to effectively address the 
national question. In a final effort to legitimize itself and its programs, the 
regime created the Worker’s Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in 1984, and in 1987 
constitutionally established the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(PDRE). The new national assembly, attempting to diffuse discontent 
among regionally- based nationality groups, created twenty-four 
administrative regions and five autonomous regions (Keller 1995). 
The Derg, (aka the committee) thus, strived to create a regular 
Communist peoples republic in the name of the toiling masses, and aimed at 
reorganizing the Ethiopian society into a collective and classless socialist 
utopia. It carried out land reform, uprooted the landed aristocracy, 
nationalized all land and private property, created a state economy, allied 
with the Soviet camp, ruled with brute military force, and denied political 
freedoms or an independent civil society. It instituted a discourse of ethno-
regional rights for minorities (nationalities in Stalinist vein) but accorded 
them little autonomy. The economy soon faltered, agricultural policies were 
a disaster, democratic practices non-existent, and armed resistance 
movements were a plague until the demise of the Derg in May 1991 (Abbink 
2009).  
Freedom of Mobility in an Ethnic-Based Federal Structure 5 
In the aftermath of the military overthrow of the Mengistu regime, the 
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) - a coalition 
of four ethno-nationalist fronts- assumed control of power, marking the 
beginning of a new political dispensation that has radically reorganized the 
Ethiopian state. Since the armed struggle had ostensibly been waged on the 
grounds that despite the fact that Ethiopia was constituted by diverse ethno-
linguistic communities, the Ethiopian state, instead of reflecting such 
diversity, had for long subjected these communities to oppression and had 
forced them to endure the life of deprivation and indignity (Aregawi 2008). 
In fact, what had traditionally been billed as the Ethiopian state was nothing 
more than a state that had effectively been captured by and been the mirror-
image of a particularistic group, namely the Amhara ruling class. In other 
words, the argument was that the existing Ethiopia was not hospitable to the 
various ethno-linguistic groups that constituted it. Thus, with some 
variations, the objective of the struggle was to dismantle the system that had 
legitimized the domination of a particularistic group over the various ethno-
linguistic groups and thereby build a new Ethiopia where all the constituent 
ethnic groups would enjoy equal treatment and respect; to put it differently, 
it could be said that the armed struggle was arguably aimed at giving birth 
to a new Ethiopia that would be suitable for ethnic diversity.  
As Horowitz (1985) argues, among power-sharing options available to 
the leaders of deeply divided societies, some form of federalism is believed 
to reduce conflict between and among culturally defined groups since it 
provides for the exercise of both self-rule and shared rule. In order to address 
the hitherto sense of domination, marginalization and exclusion felt by the 
various ethno-linguistic communities constituting the Ethiopian state, the 
new EPRDF government devised a federal system that is structured along 
ethno-linguistic cleavages. It decided, in less than two years, that the country 
would be administratively and politically reorganized, creating what are 
largely (but not exclusively) ethnically based national/regional governments 
or states (Keller & Smith 2005). It was the belief that providing Ethiopia’s 
ethnic groups the right to self-determination would lead to peace and provide 
a new basis for the unity of the country that served as the main reason behind 
the federal restructuring of the country since 1991. 
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Ethnic communities were promised that they could exercise their right 
to self-determination up to secession in the New Ethiopia. To this end, the 
1994 constitution placed sovereignty in ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ 
of Ethiopia rather than ‘we, the people’ that is common in other democratic 
constitutions. The constitution has also provided for the adoption of 
democratic form of governance through which ethnic self-determination and 
self-development would be mediated. In the new dispensation, each titular 
group or a group of titular groups was empowered to control a regional state. 
In this manner, the new constitution recognized the centrality of ethnic 
cleavages in regulating access to power and resources. The assumption was 
that if ethnic groups were to exercise self-rule in their respective federal sub-
units and participate, via their representatives, in the federal government, it 
would engender the sense of inclusion on the part of constituent ethnic 
communities and thereby create a fertile ground not only for better inter-
group relations but also for the emergence of one strong politico-economic 
community. However, when one interrogates as to how the new system has 
practically been faring vis-à-vis its lofty promises, one cannot help but feel 
more perturbed than reassured (ICG 2009, 2019; Abbink 2009).  
It is true that as is the case with any federal system, the Ethiopian federal 
arrangement empowers the constituent groups to exercise both shared rule 
and self-rule. Despite all the imperfections one could legitimately cite in the 
way these rights have been exercised, there is no denying the fact that the 
participation of ethnic groups in the federal, regional and local governance, 
i.e., in both shared rule and self-rule, has become a reality in the new political 
dispensation. The new order has created opportunities for the hitherto 
marginalized ethnic groups to gain recognition and to develop confidence in 
their language and culture, and to exercise a modicum of self-governance. 
The new federal arrangement has also improved access to resources and 
power for the hitherto neglected communities. What is more, it has provided 
ethnic communities with better access to public services, such as healthcare, 
educational opportunities, civil service jobs, justice system, etc. 
In spite of the positive developments noted above, however, the new 
federal arrangement has also produced and continued to produce its own 
serious deleterious effects. It has, for example, intensified and elevated 
Freedom of Mobility in an Ethnic-Based Federal Structure 7 
conflicts, especially at the state and lower levels, between various ethnic 
groups across a vast swathe of the country. The new federal arrangement has 
also contributed to the emergence of fierce ethno-political competition, 
exclusionist discriminatory practices, and conflicts over territory, resources, 
power and budgets (Keller and Smith 2005; Assefa 2006; Vaughan 2006). 
As Abbink (2009, 13-14) notes, “indeed, in looking at the number of local-
level communal clashes – many violent –… it can be said that a conflict-
generating dynamic was perpetuated. New conflicts appeared between 
groups previously not known for having problems.” However, these 
conflicts had largely been confined within the regional subunits and 
remained local as to be able to pose a serious threat to the central 
government. 
As is well known, the new political structure instituted by the EPRDF 
was the outcome of an armed struggle rather than a democratic political 
mobilization. As such, it was from the very beginning beset by asymmetrical 
power relations. As the armed struggle had been spearheaded by the TPLF, 
the political organizations that constituted the new governing coalition were 
themselves creatures which the TPLF brought into existence in anticipation 
of its impending military victory. In other words, the governing front 
(EPRDF) was constituted from the start by a coalition of unequals (Abdissa 
2016). In fact, it could be argued that there were three hierarchical levels in 
the EPRDF power structure: the nucleus party (TPLF), the three parties in 
the governing coalition (ANDM, OPDO & SEPDM) and the allied parties 
that would ostensibly control the five peripheral regional states. Since both 
the parties in the governing coalition and in the ‘allied’ category owed their 
very existence to the nucleus party, their continued access to power and 
resources was predicated more on their loyalty and deference to the nucleus 
party than their loyalty to the constituencies they purportedly represented 
(Abdissa 2016). 
Following the sudden death of Prime Minister Melese in 2012 and the 
subsequent appointment of Hailemariam Desalegn to the post, power 
struggle intensified between the parties that constituted the ruling coalition. 
With the ‘strong man’ gone, especially ANDM and OPDO who had covertly 
been resentful of the dominance of the TPLF in the governing coalition were 
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now emboldened to assert themselves and challenge the status quo. On the 
other hand, the TPLF was determined to maintain its overwhelming 
dominance in the political, economic, military, and security domains as 
usual. Locked in such bitter power struggle, the governing coalition lost 
unity of purpose and thereby undermined the authority and effectiveness of 
Prime Minister Hailemariam’s government. The paralysis and perceived 
incompetence of the government in addressing the growing economic 
hardships, corruption, mismanagement and abuse of power shattered public 
confidence in the legitimacy of the system and triggered an outcry. 
Specially in the last four years, intense public protest, initially 
spearheaded by the ‘Qeeroo’ (youth) due to a real or perceived sense of 
economic and political marginalization of ethnic Oromos, has quickly 
spread across Oromia, the Amhara region and other areas and rocked the 
nation, eventually forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam on 
February 15, 2018 and the appointment of Dr. Abiy Ahmed as the new Prime 
Minister on April 2, 2018. Since taking power, Prime Minister Dr. Abiy 
Ahmed has taken series of important reforms at a rapid pace (ICG 2019; 
Andreas and Samuel 2019). But in spite of and/or because of these reforms, 
ethnic conflict has intensified more in many parts of the country, including 
in the urban areas (ICG 2019; Tewele & Kursha 2019). The rule of law has 
been seriously tested with mob justice being carried out not infrequently, 
and with gun-toting vigilante groups mushrooming in various corners of the 
country, jeopardizing the security of citizens. 
According to the report by the Geneva-based group, Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Center, IDMC, the humanitarian situation in 
Ethiopia deteriorated significantly in the first half of 2018, resulting in a total 
of 1.4 million internally displaced persons. That number has reached 2.4 
million in early 2019, making Ethiopia a country with the world's biggest 
internally displaced population (Tewele & Kursha 2019). It is safe to say 
that after more than a quarter of a century long experiment with the new 
federal system, Ethiopia’s problems have increasingly become intractable, 
prompting one to wonder why a system that was ostensibly meant to 
effectively redress historical ills has produced such pathological signs. How 
does one account for such state of affairs?  
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On various occasions in the past, studies have attempted to address 
problems associated with the new federal system from different 
perspectives. For example, some studies (Assefa 2006) attributed the 
problem to the mismatch between constitutionally proclaimed principles and 
political practice. Some others (Merrera 2006) linked the problem to the 
contradictory interpretations of Ethiopian history by elites, which have made 
difficult the creation of national consensus on the modality of democratic 
governance and the political rules of the game. Still some others (ICG 2009) 
attributed the problem to a lack of commitment on the part of the governing 
elite to institutionalize a genuinely democratic system of governance. These 
studies tend to take the constitution as a given and see the problem as 
emanating from implementation rather than from the constitution itself. 
However, this author contends that neither the institutionalization of a 
genuinely democratic governance nor the achieving of congruity between 
constitutional principles and practices could effectively address freedom of 
mobility problems citizens are facing in today’s Ethiopia unless one starts to 
see the constitution as the locus of the problem. In fact, it is the contention 
of the author that under the current condition, the remedies these studies 
proposed would potentially lead to further institutionalization of ethnic 
cleavages and the aggravation of the problem of citizens’ displacement and 
the resulting curtailment of free movement of citizens within and across state 
lines.  
The problem associated with freedom of mobility of citizens in today’s 
Ethiopia can better be explained by explicating the contradictory 
conceptions of mobility and land ownership by liberals and ethno-
nationalists, and by articulating how such contradictory conceptions were 
encoded in the constitution. As is well known, “…land is of supreme social, 
economic and even political significance in Ethiopia. Land ownership or 
access to land has traditionally meant social and economic security. For 
some it has also meant power and privilege. The land question was perhaps 
the most critical underlying factor contributing to the revolution of 1974” 
Keller (1981, 534). As an agrarian society, the livelihoods of more than 
eighty percent of the Ethiopian population depend, directly or indirectly, on 
land. And freedom of mobility of citizens is closely related to ownership 
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rights, particularly that of land. Hence, addressing problems associated with 
freedom of mobility involves the explication of the contradictory 
conceptions of ownership of land by liberals (pan-Ethiopianists who espouse 
individual right) and ethno-nationalists (those who espouse group right). 
Finally, tackling freedom of mobility problems would also involve 
examining how the Ethiopian constitution addresses such contradictory 
conceptions with regards to both mobility and land ownership. And this 
chapter is an attempt to provide theoretically and contextually grounded 
analysis linking the current crisis in relation to freedom of mobility of 
citizens and the attendant land ownership issue to such contradictory 
conceptions, and the way the constitution mediates these conceptions. To 
this end, the chapter addresses the following specific research questions: 
 
 How do actors with liberal views and ethno-nationalist views 
conceive freedom of mobility and land ownership? 
 How does the Ethiopian constitution address freedom of mobility 
and land ownership issue? 
 How does the provision of the Ethiopian constitution with respect to 
freedom of mobility and land ownership, directly or indirectly, 
shape the behavior of the political actors? 
 
 
 
METHODS 
 
In order to address these research questions, different strands of 
methodological approaches were employed. First, secondary sources, such 
as extant literature on freedom of mobility and land ownership, were 
extensively consulted in order to establish solid theoretical grounds on how 
these key concepts were conceptualized from liberal and ethno-nationalist 
theoretical viewpoints. Second, upon a close reading of the Ethiopian 
constitution, textual analysis was carried out so as to shed some light on how 
the constitution addresses freedom of mobility and land ownership issues. 
Third, insights from author’s personal observations of Ethiopian politics 
over an extended period of time were also used to inform the study. The 
Freedom of Mobility in an Ethnic-Based Federal Structure 11 
author is a regular follower of Ethiopian politics, has on various occasions, 
exchanged views with various political actors as well as civil society 
members on Ethiopia’s pressing political challenges, and has been writing 
political commentaries for the last four years. The insights gained from such 
engagements were used as valuable inputs in the study. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section discusses the 
conception of freedom of mobility from liberal and ethno-nationalist 
perspectives. The second section focuses on the liberal and ethno-nationalist 
conceptions of land ownership. The third section examines the Ethiopian 
context through the theoretical lenses discussed in section one and two. The 
last section summarizes the discussions and suggests the way forward. 
 
 
CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM OF MOBILITY 
 
Liberal Conception 
 
According to Walzer (1990), there are four types of mobility: 
geographic, social, marital, and political mobility. As is known, the concept 
of freedom of mobility or freedom of movement is associated primarily with 
liberal thought. In the liberal view, the four mobilities noted above represent 
the enactment of liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (Walzer 1990). 
According to Mau (2010), liberal states are best understood as states 
organized around liberal principles, such as freedom of choice for 
individuals, individual liberties, a distinction between public and private, the 
rule of law and individual rights, and a market economy.  
Liberal states are by their very nature bound to principles which put 
constraints on the way they can enforce social closure. In liberal states, 
individuals are endowed with rights vis-a-vis the state, and states cannot act 
like despotic regimes which seek full control of their citizens and of all types 
of inward and outward mobility (Mau 2010). Liberalism is, most simply, the 
theoretical endorsement and justification of free movement (Walzer 1990). 
Thus, in liberal societies, freedom of movement within a state’s territory is 
a socially and politically well-entrenched standard (Mau 2010).  
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Liberals view the free movement of people as beneficial to individual 
freedom and the pursuit of individual life projects: The right to go where 
you want can be considered an important individual freedom. In other words, 
they believe that freedom of movement has an intrinsic value alongside other 
values, such as freedom of thought, speech, and association. They argue that 
freedom of movement presents what Baubock (2009, 7) calls a ‘‘core value 
of what it means to be free.” 
As articulated in Rawls’ (1971) Theory of Justice, the first principle of 
justice states that each person has to have an equal right to the most extensive 
scheme of equal basic liberties. And the freedom of movement is listed 
among other basic liberties, such as freedom of occupation, the right to 
personal property, freedom of association, and rights to political 
participation. Freedom of movement is also a precondition for the exercise 
of other liberal values, such as equality of opportunity, which Rawls (1971) 
calls the second principle of justice. From liberals point of view, life 
prospects and opportunities ought to be roughly equal across states and 
should not depend on the particular political jurisdiction in which someone 
is living. According to Mau (2010, 342), liberals believe that fair and equal 
access should allow everyone to attain desirable social positions on the basis 
of merit and qualification and all should have a reasonable opportunity to 
acquire these skills. Mau (2010, 342) goes on to argue that geographical 
access is directly linked to equality of opportunity, as individual life chances, 
and opportunities ultimately depend on whether people are restricted to 
certain geographical spaces. Here,  
 
social mobility can be understood as akin to geographical mobility, 
because movement in space allows people to leave uncomfortable social 
situations and positions and to pursue alternative life projects (whether 
successful or not). Denying exit and access would deprive people of 
fundamental opportunities and undermine their freedom of choice. 
Indeed…freedom of movement would enable people to move to places 
where they can improve, or at least change, their living conditions.  
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Ethno-Nationalist Conception 
 
In contrast to the liberal conception of freedom of mobility or freedom 
of movement, the ethno-nationalists’ view of mobility or movement is 
constraining or limiting, owing to ethnicity’s proclivity for boundary-
maintenance and social closure as opposed to the penchant for openness. 
This can best be explained by looking at the most important features that 
characterize ethnicity. According to Kaufmann (2000), there are four 
important features of ethnic community which seem to conflict with 
liberalism. These are symbolic boundary-maintenance; exclusive, inflexible 
and thick ethnic mythomoteurs; the use of ancestry and race as group 
boundary markers; and the desire among national groups to revive or 
maintain their ethnicity. Arguing further, Kaufmann (2000) notes how the 
task of boundary-maintenance is central to ethnicity. From Kaufmann’s 
(2000, 1092) perspective, “Without the entry barriers and assimilation 
pressures which boundary-maintenance entails, members of an ethnic group 
would not possess markers by which to identify one another. Boundary 
symbols also serve the ontological function of providing meaning and 
existential security to ethnic individuals.” In this regard, Kaufmann is in 
sync with Walzer on the importance of boundaries to the ethnic process, 
since Walzer (1983, 39) notes that “The distinctiveness of cultures and 
groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable 
feature of human life. If this distinctiveness is a value, as most people ... 
seem to believe, then closure must be permitted somewhere.”  
As Kaufmann (2000) argues, the mythomoteur of an ethnic group 
includes not only the group’s symbolic boundary criteria, but all the 
elements of its Weberian ‘ideal type.’ Similarly, in mythic terms, ethnic 
groups are wedded to particular ethno-histories (oral or written), which tell 
stories about the group’s origin, travails and golden age, just as its ‘ethnic 
maps’ outline the group’s homeland in all its poetic contours (Smith 1986). 
Over time, particular stories and figures come to be welded together into a 
single gestalt. In this sense, ethnicity manifests a drive towards selection, 
particularity and differentiation (Kaufmann 2000). What is clear in the 
preceding discussion is that while liberals, with their full embrace of 
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freedom of mobility, oppose social closure, ethno-nationalists see boundary-
maintenance and social closure as sacrosanct. Thus, there exists observable 
tension between liberalism and its conception of freedom of mobility, on one 
hand and ethno-nationalists quest for self-determination and security of their 
ethnic community, on the other. 
 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF OWNERSHIP WITH PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE TO LAND 
 
Another area that is closely connected to freedom of mobility and where 
there seems to be tension between liberals and ethno-nationalists is the 
conception of ownership, particularly with reference to land. In the 
following sub-section, the discussion of the nationalist and liberal 
conceptions of land and of its ownership is in order (in this chapter, the terms 
‘nationalist’ and ‘ethno-nationalist’ are used interchangeably). 
 
 
Nationalist Conception of Land 
 
A political theorist Levy (2000) contends that contemporary normative 
theorists of nationalism and ethnicity typically conceptualize nationhood 
and ethnicity as primarily cultural. That is, they have to do with ways of life, 
with languages spoken and tales told and values embodied and worth 
recognized. According to Levy (2000), from the perspective of such 
normative theories, nationhood and ethnicity are not understood as political 
matters; nor are they thought to concern material goods in any important 
way. In contrast to such normative conceptualizations of nationalism and 
ethnicity, Levy (2000, 197) advances the following argument: 
 
…nationalism and indigenous ethnic politics cannot be well 
understood without reference to at least one material good: land. 
Nationalist and indigenous movements conflict… with liberal societies 
about the control and possession of land but also about its social meaning, 
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the kind of good that it is. Culturalist accounts of ethnicity may be more 
easily reconcilable with liberalism…; but a liberal political theory which 
is concerned to mitigate or minimize ethnic conflicts must develop a 
framework for thinking about disputes over land. 
 
According to him, many ethnic conflicts, nationalist movements, and 
claims made by indigenous minorities are centrally about land. This is not 
to deny that they are also about language, religion, a sense of identity, or a 
way of life; but they are often about how those things relate to possession 
of, or power over, particular pieces of land. Levy (2000) adds that 
nationalism celebrates a people’s history and culture, but it also celebrates 
their land. Moreover, it celebrates the link between the two. What is more, 
Levy (2000, 204) further contends that:  
 
Nationalism thinks about…homeland in certain recurrent ways. It 
elides [ignores] the distinction between sovereignty and ownership; all of 
the land belongs to this people, from whom it cannot be taken away. 
Nationalism typically conceptualizes land as place, not property. This piece 
of land is part of the patrimony of this nation. Perhaps it is of particular 
historical or religious importance. Perhaps the beauty of this spot is a cause 
for national pride, or perhaps this kind of terrain is taken to embody 
something about the nation…. Even when the particular piece of land has 
no such distinctiveness, however, it remains national soil. A people is in 
some way particularly well-suited to this piece of land. It is where one’s 
ancestors are buried, an important and recurring image. 
 
The political movements of ethnic groups and/or indigenous peoples are 
about land more than any other issue- about the right to prevent or at least 
benefit from development on their traditional lands, about the restoration of 
lands from which they have been dispossessed, and about securing against 
future losses (Levy 2000). 
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Liberal Conception of Land 
 
According to Levy (2000, 206-207),  
 
Liberalism has a very different image of what land is. Land is, in 
general, fungible [or exchangeable] with other goods. It is alienable- it can 
be bought, sold, used as collateral for credit, leased, rented, and so on. It is 
divisible, both in space and in the rights that accrue to it; a plot of land 
might be divided in half, or its subsurface mineral rights might be owned 
separately from the surface, and so on. It circulates, as money and other 
goods circulate; sometimes it is held by one person, sometimes by another. 
Sometimes it is put to one use, sometimes to another. A piece of land can 
generally be exchanged for another piece, if not necessarily one of the same 
size, or exchanged for cash. Moreover, there is no necessary tie between 
particular persons and particular places…. Land, in short, is property, not 
place. 
 
And such decoupling of people and land makes mobility an 
unproblematic exercise in liberal societies. 
As discussed earlier, Walzer (1990) has characterized liberal society as 
importantly marked by four mobilities. These are geographic, social, marital 
and political. Of these, the first two- geographic and social- are closely 
related to the flexibility of land. The ability to sell the piece of land on which 
one currently lives and go elsewhere and buy a new one has always been 
tightly related to geographic mobility in liberal societies. Since by social 
mobility Walzer (1990) means not only changes in income but also changes 
in the way income is earned from one generation to the next, the fungibility 
of land with other goods has made a tremendous difference here as well 
(Levy 2000). Thus, a free, democratic, commercial society is thought of as 
more than simply a state that respected rights of various kinds. It is a society 
of a particular kind, one characterized by mobility, the rise and fall of elites 
based on achievement, and certain fluidity (Levy 2000). Thus, the liberal 
and nationalist/indigenous conceptions of land have conflicted in a number 
of ways over the years, and as a result, liberals and nationalists often tend to 
talk past each other on the issue of land (Levy 2000). 
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MAKING SENSE OF THE ETHIOPIAN CONTEXT THROUGH 
THESE THEORETICAL LENSES 
 
It seems that there exists tension in the Ethiopian constitution between 
the liberal and nationalist conceptions of freedom of mobility and the issue 
of land owernership. With reference to citizens’ freedom of movement, the 
1994 Ethiopian constitution under Article 32, sub-article 1, for example, 
states the following: “Any Ethiopian or foreign national lawfully in Ethiopia 
has, within the national territory, the right to liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose his residence, as well as the freedom to leave the country 
at any time he wishes to.” In connection to the right to property, Article 40, 
sub-article 1, provides the following: “Every Ethiopian citizen has the right 
to the ownership of private property. Unless prescribed otherwise by law on 
account of public interest, this right shall include the right to acquire, to use 
and, in a manner compatible with the rights of other citizens, to dispose of 
such property by sale or bequest or to transfer it otherwise.” Thus, with 
respect to freedom of mobility and property ownership, these two 
constitutional provisions could be said to be consonant with the liberal 
conception of freedom of movement and the right to property. At least at a 
theoretical level, these provisions seem to legitimize the freedom of mobility 
of citizens across regional state lines and their right to make decisions as to 
where they should live, exercise their right to own property, make a living, 
and etc.  
On the other hand, Article 40, sub-article 3, states that “The right to 
ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is 
exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a 
common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and 
shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange.” Under the ‘Rights 
of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ codified in Article 39, sub-article 1 
provides the following: “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia 
has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to 
secession.” These provisions seem to reflect the ethno-nationalist view of 
ownership right and of the freedom of movement, albeit in an indirect way 
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in the latter’s case. If land is a common property of ‘nations, nationalities, 
and peoples’- a code name for ethnic collectives- and is not subject to sale 
or to other means of exchange, citizens cannot exercise their rights enshrined 
under Article 32, sub-article 1 and under Article 40, Sub-article 1.  
As discussed earlier, the task of boundary-maintenance is central to 
ethnicity, as it plays an important role in establishing markers by which to 
identify one another. What is more, boundary symbols serve the ontological 
function of providing meaning and existential security to ethnic individuals. 
As Walzer (1983, 39) notes, “The distinctiveness of cultures and groups 
depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature 
of human life.” And boundary-maintenance and social closure is the 
antithesis of freedom of mobility. In order for ethnic collectives to exercise 
their constitutionally given “an unconditional right to self-determination, 
including the right to secession,” there is no question that they would have 
to focus on strengthening boundary-maintenance and social closure. The 
more they do this, the more it constrains citizens’ right to freedom of 
mobility and to property ownership (especially the ownership of land). 
Because the constitution fuses into one two contradictory conceptions of 
freedom of mobility and ownership rights, it has given political actors the 
opportunity to exploit these contradictory conceptions to serve their 
particularistic interests. In such a manner, it has contributed to the 
progressive deterioration of situations as the continued evictions, expulsions 
and displacements of citizens in various parts of the country indicate. As is 
often the case, the evictions, expulsions and displacements of citizens from 
regional states are carried out on the grounds that they (the victims) do not 
belong to the titular groups that ostensibly ‘own’ these regional states, and 
by doing so, ensure ethnic boundary-maintenance and social closure. 
In order to address these contradictory conceptions with respect to 
freedom of mobility and the issue of ownership, it is important to start with 
the examination of the realities on the ground in today’s Ethiopia. As is well 
known, the liberal conception of mobility and its attendant ownership issue 
is largely predicated on a predominantly urban-based industrial society’s 
context. Such a society is composed of laborers, professionals, business 
people, industrialists, etc., whose livelihood does not depend on land. In an 
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environment of competition, they freely move from one place to another in 
search of a better opportunity. They go wherever life takes them and in their 
new destination, they can own property, they can rent it, they can buy and 
sell it, they can pass it onto a third party, and so on, as long as they have the 
means, Thus, in an urban-based industrial society, citizens and land are 
significantly decoupled. On the other hand, in a rural-based agrarian society 
like Ethiopia where more than eighty percent of the population lives in the 
countryside, the overwhelming majority of citizens’ livelihoods depend on 
land. What defines them is not mobility; it is holding onto their land. For 
them, mobility is a luxury as they lack requisite skills, training, knowledge, 
etc., that are marketable. As a result, many of them often live and die without 
traveling beyond thirty to forty kilometers radius from their abode. With the 
ever increasing population growth, soil fertility challenge and the conditions 
of climate change, and the self-serving nature of the political elites, there is 
an increasing tendency in ethnic hinterlands to jealously guard the rural land 
against perceived “encroachers” who happen to be ethnic “Others” who have 
moved to these areas on different historical periods and settled there for a 
long time. 
Here focus is made on the rural context because if one carefully 
examines mobility-associated problems in urban and rural contexts, he/she 
would easily notice significant differences. Most of the evictions, expulsions 
and displacements carried out in different regional states since 1991 (unless 
in an exceptional situation) are, for example, based in rural areas as could be 
seen from Ethiopian Human Rights Council’s (HRCO) Annual reports 
published since 1991. However, with all its constraints (such as holding a 
political office), citizens’ mobility in urban areas, i.e., cities across regional 
states is relatively healthy. In other words, the evictions, expulsions and 
displacements of citizens based on ethnic identity is almost a rare occurrence 
in cities across the regional states. Citizens could still own property, engage 
in business activities, earn wages for their labor, take professional jobs 
(regulated by supply and demand) and make a living (save the experiences 
in the last couple of years where such evictions and displacements have 
become common in urban areas as well, due to the overall deterioration of 
the political environment). Relatively speaking, there is a decoupling of 
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people and land in the urban context, as boundary-maintenance and social 
closure is much weaker. Here, we can see the applicability, albeit with a 
qualification, of the liberal concept of freedom of mobility and of ownership 
of land. In the rural context, however, the phenomenon appears to be quite 
different. Here, boundary-maintenance and social closure is intense; the 
desire to secure ‘ethnic homeland’ and maintain the ethnic character of one’s 
territory is more acute. As a result, the liberal view of freedom of mobility 
and of ownership of land does not seem to hold much ground in the rural 
context; instead, it is the nationalist view that appears to have a field day 
here. 
This phenomenon appears in sync with the analysis of a German 
sociologist, Ferdinand Tonnies, with reference to the earlier forms of 
European social organization and European society as it existed in the late 
nineteenth century. In his analysis, Tonnies (1887, as cited in Baran & Davis 
2015) proposed a simple dichotomy- gemeinschaft, or folk/traditional 
community, and gestellschaft, or modern industrial society. According to 
Tonnies (1887, as cited in Baran & Davis 2015), in gestellschaft– modern 
industrial society- people are bound together by relatively weak social 
institutions based on rational choices rather than tradition. Gestellschaft 
represents “the framework of laws and other formal regulations that 
characterized large, urban industrial societies. Social relationships were 
more formalized and impersonal; individuals did not depend on one another 
for support---and were therefore much less morally obligated to one 
another” (Fukuyama 1999, 57-58). 
On the other hand, in gemeinschaft, or folk/traditional communities, 
people were bound together by strong ties of family, kinship, tradition, and 
rigid social roles, as basic social institutions were very powerful (Tonnies 
1887, as cited in Baran & Davis 2015). As Fukuyama (1999, 57) argues, 
gemeinschaft “consisted of a dense network of personal relationships based 
heavily on kinship and the direct, face-to-face contact that occurs in a small, 
closed village. Norms were largely unwritten, and individuals were bound 
to one another in a web of mutual interdependence that touched all aspects 
of life.” Although the Ethiopian society taken at large can be characterized 
as a rural-based agrarian society, there is a distinction to be made along 
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urban-rural divide. Historically, modernity has not been uniformly 
experienced among the Ethiopian society as development has often had 
urban-bias (e.g., almost all the industries built in Ethiopia are concentrated 
in a few urban areas). As a result, the rural society in today’s Ethiopia mainly 
resembles the preindustrial European society, which Tonnies has described 
as ‘gemeinschaft;’ whereas the urban society of today’s Ethiopia, more or 
less, shares the features of the modern industrial society of the late 
nineteenth century Europe, which Tonnies described as ‘gestellschaft.’ 
Hence, it is hardly surprising that with respect to freedom of mobility and 
ownership of land, the liberal view seems to prevail in the urban areas, 
whereas the ethno-nationalist view appears to resonate in the rural context. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The Ethiopian experiment with ethnic-based federal system is arguably 
precipitated by historical grievances that the various ethnic communities had 
with successive Ethiopian regimes. The constitution, which has codified the 
terms of coexistence among constituent social groups in a view to effectively 
addressing such historical ills has unfortunately produced some serious 
impediments for peaceful coexistence. This phenomenon is partly 
attributable to the constitutional adoption of contradictory conceptions of 
freedom of mobility and of the attendant ownership rights in general and 
land ownership rights in particular. 
It is not uncommon to hear, on public and private media outlets, the 
victims of ethnic-based evictions and expulsions appealing to the liberal 
aspect of the constitution by accusing the ethnic perpetrators (ethnic 
majorities that ostensibly own the region or district) of flagrantly violating 
their constitutional rights to the freedom of movement within the Ethiopian 
territory and their rights to ownership of property including land. On the 
other hand, the ethnic perpetrators (through their actions, if not through their 
public pronouncements) equally appeal to the ethno-nationalist conception 
of freedom of movement and of the issue of ownership codified in the same 
constitution to legitimatize their actions. In order to address this problem, it 
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is imperative that political elites should first recognize the existence of such 
contradictory conceptions in the current constitution and take concerted 
effort to find a way to reconcile or at least to narrow down the contradictions 
in a manner that would promote peaceful coexistence. In order to do this, 
there should be elite consensus on the need to revisit the constitution and 
make the necessary amendments. 
Secondly, it is also important to recognize the fact that in order to fully 
translate the liberal view of freedom of mobility and of the attendant issue 
of ownership, with particular reference to land, priority should be given to 
bringing about industrial transformation and urbanization, and the creation 
of an urban-industrial society where citizens’ livelihoods do not depend on 
land. However, this does not happen overnight regardless of how much one 
desires it. This means that as Ethiopia strives to industrialize as speedy as 
humanly possible, it should be recognized that it will still continue to be a 
largely rural-based agrarian society for some time to come. Similarly, it is 
crucial to recognize that in a rapidly modernizing Ethiopia, clinging to a 
rigid form of boundary-maintenance and social closure is untenable and 
counterproductive. Thus, Ethiopians need to find a way to contain the 
deleterious effects of the nationalist’s view of mobility and land ownership, 
on one hand, and to acknowledge the limits of the liberal conception of free 
mobility and ownership rights in a predominantly rural-based agrarian 
society of today’s Ethiopia, on the other.  
This means that there should be concessions to be made on both sides of 
the isle, i.e., between the pan-Ethiopianists or liberals camp and ethno-
nationalists’ camp. With a long term view and broader national interest in 
sight, elites drawn from a cross-section of society should enter a grand 
bargain in a give-and-take process and create a win-win situation that would 
eventually promote peaceful coexistence as a society. And failure to commit 
oneself to making such concessions in time by both camps would likely 
exacerbate the already precarious political situation and thereby put the 
integrity of the Ethiopian state at serious risk. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article provides a descriptive account of language use in Ethiopia 
by focusing on language use patterns in education, media and 
administration in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s 
Regional State (SNNPRS). Key informants from the regional media, 
education bureau, Hawassa University and the Council of Nationalities of 
the SNNPRS provide unique insight into the layers of complexity related 
to language use. The findings show linguistic rights granted to the ethno-
linguistic groups enabled several languages to be codified; it enabled 
ethno-linguistic groups to use their language in all walks of life; it helped 
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some groups to reconstruct their intra-group identity. The linguistic rights, 
however, have brought no changes for some ethno-linguistic groups as 
their languages still remains oral and not used institutionally. The lack of 
language policy and planning has created irregular language use and 
development patterns in institutions. Languages have also been used as a 
means for ethnic groups to claim administrative independence. This has 
been a source of conflict among different dialect speakers of similar 
languages. Some dialect speakers claim that their language variety is 
different, and that they do not understand the other dialects of the language. 
Some dialect speakers decline from using any of the other dialects 
institutionally lest its use may cause a challenge to intergroup identify. This 
study suggests language use policy and language planning actions in 
Ethiopia.  
 
Keywords: diversity, Ethiopia, multilingualism, policy, rights 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CPD  Continuous Professional Development; 
EPDRF  Ethiopian People Democratic Republic Front; 
EPA  Ethiopian Phonetic Alphabet; 
KI  Key Informant; 
KII  Key Informant Interview; 
L1 MT; 
L2  Second Language; 
MoE Ministry of Education; 
MoCT  Ministry of Culture and Tourism; 
MT  Mother Tongue; 
MTE  Mother Tongue based Education; 
SNNPRS  Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Regional State; 
TVET  Technical, Vocational Education Training. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper attempts to provide an overview of language use patterns in 
education, media and administration of the Southern Nation, Nationalities 
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and Peoples’ Regional state.The study is significant in that it uncovers the 
irregularities in language use with implied inequality of languages and the 
language users. These in turn have effects in education quality, socio-
economic development and maintaining basic human rights.  
The paper is meant for diverse readers as it is less technical, and uses 
less profession jargons. Because it covers wider topics: education, media and 
administration in relation to language use, transdisciplinary researchers and 
readers may find it worth reading. The findings will cross-sectionally help 
language planners, educators, administrators, human rights activists and 
politicians as language use is important to all these agents. 
 
 
Background 
 
Ethiopia is a mosaic of languages and cultures (Awoke 2007) with 
diverse ethnic groups living adjacent or interspersed. The exact number of 
languages and ethnic groups is debated and dynamic ranging from 75 to 98 
(Wedekind 2002; Yonattan 2014; Záhořík and Teshome 2009). The 
language use situations and ethnic grouping of the country is not static, being 
influenced by a range; the very number ethnic groups is dynamic and 
varying due to number of factors such as migration, urbanization and 
education. Not all ethnic groups in the country align with the languages they 
speak. Hudson (2012; 1999) identified the dynamic nature of ethnicity and 
language by comparing the 1994 and 2007 Ethiopian census and reported 
that the “2007 census reported 85 Ethiopian ethnic groups vs. 80 of the 1994 
census, and the 2007 census reported 87 Ethiopian mother tongues vs. 77 of 
the 1994 census” (Hudson 2012, 204). The complexity can be attributed to 
differnt factors, such as language death (Ex: Masmas and Ethiopian 
Murle/Alangach) which cause the existence of ethnic groups without 
language; problem of differentiating language and dialects, which is affected 
by politics and attitude (Hudson 2004); ethno-linguistic group that were 
considered one may be divided; thus, become different groups as it was 
experienced by the Silte, which was considered Gurage (Fekede 2015, 6). 
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Similar to debate on the number of languages and ethnic groups, there 
is no consensus on the classification of Ethiopian languages particularily 
with internal sub-classifications, it is ever changing. The languages spoken 
in Ethiopia belong to two super families: Afro-asiatic and Nilo-Saharn. 
Afro-asitic consists of six sub-families; of which, Semitic, Cushitic and 
Omotic are spoken in Ethiopia.The Omotic language was initially 
considered part of Cushitic until it is considered separate sub-family of Afro-
asiatic. The Omotic language showed several linguistic features different 
from cushitic including tone. It is also spoken only in Ethiopia unlike the 
other language families spoken in the country. Of the Nilo-saharan super 
family, some of them are spoken in Ethiopia. All the three sub-families of 
Afro-asiatic and a few languages of Nilo-saharan are sopken in the SNNPRS 
where this study focuses.  
Regarding linguistic rights in Ethiopia, it is worth highlighting the issue 
in three Ethiopian constitutions; namely, the 1955 constitution of Ethiopia, 
which was revised in the 1931 (www.Chilot.me), the 1987 constitution of 
People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Negarit Gazetta 1987), and the 
1995 constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(www.wipo). 
According to the 1955 constitution, the “official language of the Empire 
[Ethiopia] was Amharic” (Article 125). The Ethiopian constitution in the 
Dergue regime (1974-1991), which was redrafted in 1987, stated that the 
“People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall ensure the equality, 
development and respectability of the languages of the nationalities” (Article 
2(5)) and that “Ethiopians are guaranteed freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, peaceful demonstration and association” (Article 47). It specified 
the official language in Article 116, as: “Without prejudice to article 2 sub 
article 5, of this constitution, in the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia the working language of the state shall be Amharic”. The 1995 
constitution of the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Republic 
Front (EPDRF) made no significant changes with regard to linguistic rights 
granted in 1987. The main linguistic issues stated in the 1995 constitution, 
in Article 5, include: 
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1.  “All Ethiopian languages shall enjoy equal state recognition.  
2.  Amharic shall be the working language of the Federal Government.  
3.  Members of the Federation may by law determine their respective 
working languages”. 
 
In Article 29(2), it adds: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression without any interference. This right shall include freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through 
any media of his choice”.  
 
 
Figure 1. Administrative map of SNNPRS (Source: SNNPRS Finance). 
The linguistic rights given to everyone in Article 29(2) is restated as a 
group right in Article 39 as “every Nation, Nationality and People in 
Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to 
express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history”.  
Regional states of the federation have been organized based on 
settlement, language, identity claim and consent as stated in Article 46: 
“States shall be delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, 
identity and consent of the peoples concerned”. The SNNPRS has been 
different in this regard since it has 56 ethnic groups and languages. Thus, the 
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delimitation of this state does not satisfy the linguistic, identity and consent 
criteria, and in fact after two decades, some of the ethno-linguistic groups 
have recently claimed separate regions, zone administrations, etc, based on 
group identity and language. Figure 1 shows the administrative map of 
SNNPRS. 
 
 
Methods 
 
The scope of the article is limited geographically to the SNNPRS where 
56 languages of Semitic, Cushitic, Omotic and Nilo-Saharan sub-families 
are spoken, and temporally to the period from 1994 to the 2018.  
The research follows cross-sectional descriptive design and qualitative 
methodology. It draws upon key informant interviews and document 
analysis, including policy documents and available data in the education 
bureau and in the media. Three KIs from each of the four institutes; namely, 
Council of Nationalities of the SNNPRS, South Television and Radio, 
Bureau of Tourism and Culture, and Hawassa University were selected 
purposefully based on their knowledge of the region as well as institutional 
language use. The KIs were largely used to verify and triangulate the data 
from different sources, collected documents and available statistics in the 
regional bureaus.  
 
 
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
 
There are about 56 nationalities1 and 19 Cushitic, 25 Omotic, 10 Nilo-
Saharan and 2 Semitic languages2 in SNNPRS. In fact, a few of the 
                                                          
1A nationality is used in the sense used by the Council of Nationalities of the SNNPRS. It may 
refer to ethnic group or ‘nation’ though the very existence of a ‘nation’ in the country can be 
questioned.  
2The two Semitic languages, Silte and Guragina, were considered one at least politically until the 
Silte group claimed Separate identity and was considered a separate group. The so called 
Guragina language also consists of 11 dialect clusters with different levels mutual and/or 
unidirectional intelligibility. 
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nationalities speak more than one language and/or dialect; some others have 
lost their language, and shifted to another language. Therefore, the number 
of languages spoken in the region does not necessarily correspond to the 
number of ethnic groups.  
 
 
Language Use in Education 
 
Language use in Ethiopian education since 1994 has been one of the 
most contested policy issues (cf. Seidel and Moritz 2009; Daniel and 
Abebayehu 2006). Based on the 1994 Ethiopian constitution, the Ministry 
of Education ratified an Education and Training Policy (ETP) in which 
language use in education is a part. The core issues stated about language 
use in the ETP education are expounded as follows: 
 
“Cognizant of the pedagogical advantage of the child in learning in 
mother tongue and the rights of nationalities to promote the use of their 
languages, primary education will be given in nationality languages. 
Making the necessary preparation, nations and nationalities can either learn 
in their own language or can choose from among those selected on the basis 
of national and countrywide distribution. The language of teacher training 
for kindergarten and primary education will be the nationality language 
used in the area. Amharic shall be taught as a language of countrywide 
communication. English will be the medium of instruction for secondary 
and higher education. Students can choose and learn at least one nationality 
language and one foreign language for cultural and international relations. 
English will be taught as a subject starting from grade one. The necessary 
steps will be taken to strengthen language teaching at all levels” (MoE, 
1994, 23-24). 
 
Of the 56 languages recognized constitutionally in the SNNPRS, 29 
languages (53.7%)3in the SNNPRS are used as a medium and/or taught as 
subject; the rest 26 languages (46.3%) are not yet in school use for several 
                                                          
3 At country level, 46 languages are used as a medium, a subject or both.  
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reasons, such as dialect variation, lack of educated persons to teach the 
language, major languages dominating the minor languages use, etc. 
Amharic is used as medium in most of the schools where mother tongues are 
not used as a medium, such as Gurage. Some languages use their 
neighboring dominant language, such as Mao people using Kafenoono. 
English is taught as a subject in all grade levels, and it becomes a medium 
of instruction from grade 5 to the university. That is, bi(tri)-medium is used 
in schools in the region. The number of languages used in education in the 
region since 1994 has been ever increasing; the bar graph in Figure 2 shows 
the number of languages since 1994-2018, based on their genetic 
relationships: 
 
 
Figure 2. Mother tongues in & outside school system in the SNNPRS. 
The numbers of languages used in education (29) are only slightly 
higher than those that are not used (26). This may be an issue regarding 
equity and fairness. 
Associated with language use in education are (i) script choice (ii) language 
use pattern in the bi(tri)lingual model and (iii) quality of education, 
discussed in what follows. 
 
Script Choice 
Since there is nothing stated in either the constitution or education policy 
about script choice, ethno-linguistic groups began using different scripts to 
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write their language, mainly Latin or Ethiopic. This made Ethiopia not only 
multilingual, but also a multi-script user. Prior to 1994, the script for most 
Ethiopian languages, if they were written for any purpose, used Ethiopic 
script though this has not been constitutionally restricted. Figure 3 shows the 
current script use pattern: 
 
 
Figure 3. Script choices in the SNNPRS. 
Of the 29 languages used in mother tongue education in the SNNPRS, 
only 4 (13.8%) languages (Silte, Qabena, Basketo and Surma) use Ethiopic 
script. The rest, 25 (86.2%) languages use Latin script. Thus, script choice 
to a large extent is tending to Latin. Latin based orthography preference by 
the majority, according to KIs, is because Ethiopic script does not handle 
length, gemination and a few unique symbols. What is more, as to the KIs, 
there was a negative attitude towards Amharic language, which was 
considered the language of the rulers who dominated other ethnic groups. 
The attitude towards Amhara people was associated to the Amharic 
language and at the same time to the Ethiopic script with which Amharic is 
written. 
According to the KIs, there have been complaints on the Latin-based 
script, which was chosen in favor of Ethiopic, elsewhere in the region. One 
of the challenges is that students confuse some sounds of the mother tongues 
with English, which is also in the school system. For instance, the letter ‘c’ 
is pronounced either as a/k/ as in the word cat or /s/ as in the word city, but 
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in most of the mother tongues in the SNNPRS, /c/ represents /ʧ’/, an alveo-
palatal ejective sound. Similarly, the English sound /x/ represents an alveolar 
ejective /t’/ as in Sidaama. It is confusing because /x/ represents /z/ or 
clusters of /ks/ as in the initial and the final /x/ in Xerox in English, 
respectively. A second challenge is that Latin script use has created an 
intergeneration gap: adults cannot read the languages written with Latin 
script though some can read and understand when the language is written in 
Ethiopic. KIs also reported that the Latin-based script is difficult for second 
language learners who would like to study mother tongues written in Latin 
if they come from non-Latin based script use tradition.  
 
Language Use Pattern in Education 
Since the language use policy with regard to development direction of 
mother tongues is not specified, the pattern in which mother tongues are used 
in the school system in SNNPRS is not uniform.  
There are different bilingual education models (Hornberger 1996; 
Fekede 2008; Benson 2004). Five of the most commonly recognized 
language use models are: (a) submersion which mainstreams non-native 
speaking students into regular L2 classrooms with the aim to assimilate the 
L1 learner to L2 which may result in subtraction of the L1. (b)transitional 
bilingual education model that teaches content area with the mother tongue 
language but teaching the student another L2 and/or L3. The objective of this 
program is assimilation and L1 reduction like the submersion model. (c) 
maintenance bilingual education in which learners are transitioned into L2(3) 
content classes, & continue receiving content in L1, that is, they become 
literate in both languages; the main aim of this type of education is to 
promote bilingualism and biliteracy with aspired result of linguistic 
pluralism or an additive bilingualism. (d)enrichment or developmental 
bilingual model in which L2(3) and L1 content classes may be separated 
initially, but the goal is to have the students of both language background 
studying content classes in both languages; the goal is development of 
biliterate and bilingual individuals with expected result of pluralism or 
additive bilingualism. (e)immersion is the case where majority language 
speakers learning an L2 with large numbers of minority language(s) speaking 
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children, such as Oromo language speakers learning Amharic with all other 
Ethiopian language speakers; the aim of this model is pluralist with expected 
result of additive bilingualism. 
Generally, based on their goal, the bilingual education models assume 
either assimilation or additive bilingualism. In the assimilation goal to L2 or 
pluralism, L1 and L2 function together with the results in subtraction of L1; 
submersion and transition models serve this purpose. The pluralist goal 
results in additive bilingualism because both L1 and L2 are maintained and/or 
developed, the maintenance, enrichment, and immersion models have these 
roles. 
Now, based on these classifications of bilingual education model, let us 
look into the trends of bilingual education in Ethiopia in general and in the 
SNNPRS in particular.  
The bilingual education in Ethiopia falls into two categories. This is 
demonstrated with languages in the SNNPRS to be more focused. Most of 
the languages, 18 (62.06%), including Dizi, Zayse, Konso, Benchenon, 
Meenit, Shekinono, Oyda, Qabena, Libdo, Gidicho, Basketo, Yemsa, 
Koorete, Dashitte, Halaba, Tenbaro, Surma, Aari tend to follow transitional 
bilingual education model. So far, they are used as a medium and/or taught 
as subject in grades 1-4. From grade five to a university, the medium is 
English, which is also taught as a subject; Amharic which is taught as a 
subject from grades 1-4 continues until it may be dropped by students in 
grade 10. The goal and outcome seem assimilation and subtractive, 
respectively. However, since the students learn English as a foreign 
language, and there is no native like control of the language, the students 
cannot assimilate to English. There is some tendency for some students to 
be assimilated to Amharic without subtraction of the students’ mother 
tongue due to the classroom language use. 
The other 11 languages, (37.93%), can be grouped into the maintenance 
bilingual education (MBE) model as L1 is used as a medium in grades 1-4, 
and students are shifted to English medium in grade five to the university 
levels, and at the same times the L1 is taught as a subject from grades 1-10 
(Kamabata and Konta), from 1-12 (Silte, Kafinono, Dawro, and Gedeofa), 
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and in the university in Diploma and BA programs (Sidamuafo, Wolayta, 
Hadiyyisa, Gamo and Gofa and in 2018 Kambata and Dawro).  
The general trend, however, seems for most languages to go for the 
MBE model. The languages that already moved into the MBE are the one 
that have begun MT education earlier, and have already developed capacity 
of human and material resources that are required for MT education. The 
languages in the transitional bilingual education model are the one that 
began MT education more recently, yet they are attempting to increase the 
grade level in which their L1 is taught as a subject. It seems, it is a matter of 
time, finance, and other material and human resource for all the languages 
in the SNNPRS to follow the MBE model, unless and otherwise there is 
revision in language use policy of Ethiopia. In fact, the education road map 
of 2018, which is in progress, proposes a flexible language use policy in 
education while proposing MT use in grades 1-6, Amharic as language of 
wider communication is to be taught from grade 1-12, and English to be 
taught as a subject from grade one, and to be used as a medium of instruction 
from grade seven to the university level.  
 
Quality of Education 
The main purpose of using mother tongues in education is to improve 
education quality by making language use easy. It has been voiced by 
UNESCO that mother tongue or native language is natural instrument of 
thought and communication (UNESCO, 1953). In fact, there are other 
sociological reasons for introducing MTs to school systems, such as 
maintaining group identity, language maintenance and political 
independence discussed in section 2.4.  
Despite the aspired goal of making education easier, thereby improving 
its quality, it was found that quality of MTE is at risk due to a number of 
factors. Methodologically, the way mother tongues were taught needs 
improvement. A survey report of early grade reading assessments (Smith et 
al. 2012) showed that students in the SNNPRS performed low in reading in 
their mother tongue. This has been attributed to the curriculum materials and 
teaching methods used. Recently, a new curriculum was developed to tackle 
the problem in seven mother tongues across Ethiopia. Three languages: 
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Wolayta, Hadiyya, and Sidama in the SNNPRS were parts of the pilot 
program. Materials were prepared and trainers were trained in these three 
languages. The curriculum was piloted since 2014. If effective, this will be 
transferred to the other mother tongue teaching programs in the region. 
It was reported by the KIs from the Bureau of Education in the region 
that the government has been working hard to train teachers in in-service 
and at regular programs. Most teachers having certificates from teachers 
training institute have been upgraded to diploma level and those who had 
diploma to the first-degree level. There is a continuous professional 
development (CPD) as well.  
Despite these efforts, KIs reported, there are complaints that teachers 
recruited for trainings for due teaching of mother tongues are the last resort 
(recruited after the high scorers have joined preparatory schools and the 
Technical, Vocational Education Training (TVET) program). According to 
the KIs, this has two main problems:  
 
i)  Trainees with poor education background complete with poor teaching 
skills and knowledge thereby creating vicious circle in education 
quality. 
ii)  As government has to re-train to upgrade the skills of poorly trained 
mother tongue teachers, it incurs more expense. 
 
Another problem mentioned by KIs is that the education bureaus in 
different zones do not clearly and timely report the progress of curriculum 
in mother tongues, which are often developed in the respective zones. On 
the other hand, the Education Bureau of the SNNPRS is not well informed 
when some MT education programs are launched, so there are a few ways 
of making follow ups. 
Another missing link mentioned by the KIs is that orthography 
development takes place by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The 
Education Bureau on the other hand recognizes the MT languages only when 
they are used as a medium or a subject in schools. Thus, there are no ways 
for the two stakeholders to work together beginning from the orthography 
development and syllabus design to the use of the medium. It was reported 
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that in some cases, ethno-linguistic groups develop their language 
orthography by themselves without the knowledge of MoCT and MoE; and 
then they begin the mother tongue education program for subsequent 
negotiation with Education Bureau of the Region for recognition and license. 
Mareqo mother tongue education program in the Gurage Zone is one of the 
cases in point. 
The participants of the study further reported that students could not use 
English as a medium after they have learnt it for four years (grades 1-4) as a 
subject. Thus, using English as a medium in grade 5 seems implausible 
(Birhanu 2009; Fekede and Hailu forthcoming).  
Due to all the factors outlined here, the envisaged improved quality 
education is not well achieved in the region; implying that MTE 
implementation strategies need revisiting and strict follow ups.  
 
 
Language Use in Media 
 
The 1994 Ethiopian constitutional linguistic right and the follow up 
language use in different media has brought significant changes in language 
use patterns. Several government-owned media, community radio and 
televion, and private owned radio and television, which were not allowed 
prior to this period, came into use. In the SNNPRS alone, 47 of the officially 
recognized 54 languages are used in media at different levels and varied 
distributon of air time.4 What is more, some of the ethno-linguistic groups 
whose language is not used institutionally as in media and schools, such as 
Gurage, use the airtime assigned for them to broadcast information about 
their localities, but they use Amharic. With regard to Gurage, it was reported 
that Amharic is used as an option because a particular Gurage dialect choice 
and use for institutional settings is found to be a problem. 
 
 
                                                          
4 At country level, 55 MTs are used in community radio, 25 in FM radio, 5 in national and foreign 
radio broadcast, 5 in TV entertainments, 8 in News casting, and 9 in relegates (Alemayehu, 
2016). 
Language Use in Multilingual Ethiopia 41 
Table 1. Languages in Media in the SNNPRS 
 
Cluster Area set Area coverage 
1 Wolkite Hadiyya, Halaba, Gurage, silte and Yem 
2 Waka Dawro,Wolayta, Konta, Kembata, and Tembaro 
3 Arbaminch Gamo, Gofa, Oyda, Gidicho, Zayse, Darashe, Konso, 
Ale, Basketo, Mashole, Mossiye, and Kosome  
4 Jinka Dasenech, Ari, Maale, Dime, Bana, Tsamay, Hamer, 
Nyangatom, Dasenech, Arbore, Kara and Bodi 
5 Fisha Genet Gedeo, Kore, and Burji 
6 Mizan Bench, Sheko, Dizi, Me’enit 
7 Bonga Kefa, Sheka, Na’o, chara, and Majangir 
8 Sidama Sidama only 
 
The access for media is made possible through clusters of stations and 
substations connected in the form of relay (shown in Table 1). The 
ethnolinguistic groups are enjoying listening to information in their own 
language. It was found by KIs that media in their own language is 
particularly useful for those who do not understand language of wider 
communication, such as Amharic. They add, it also helps to maintain 
languages and cultures by providing institutional support. Several setbacks 
in the programs have also been mentioned. because the air time given for 
some ethnolinguistic groups is too short, an hour or two, they have to 
transmit just developmental issues such as agriculture and health only; 
hence, entertainment in their language is marginalized. Some ethnic groups 
suffered from script challenges; they have airtime for media use yet the 
language is not codified and has no orthography. They had to write news in 
Amharic and transliterate it with a latin-based script, which is less consistent, 
to suit their personal news casting. 
Another importance of mother tongues in media is that some of the local 
languages, 29 of the 49, are also used in education. Some of the languages 
used in media to transmit education include: Hadiyyissa, Kambatissa, 
Gedeoffa, Kontatswa, Qabena, Dawro, Wolayta, Sidamuafo, Siltigna, 
Mareqo, Gamo and Gofa. 
A few of the major problems in media use mentioned by the KIs 
include:journalists leaving job for better pay and place of work; short area 
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coverage, and lack of journalists for some languages which are not yet in use 
institutionally. It was reported that expansion works were done in Hossana, 
Sawla and Sheka to solve area coverage problems.  
 
 
Language Use in Administration 
 
The most common function of language is its use in administration and 
communication of different domains: media, home, market, churches and 
mosques. Administration is a domain in which language is used to govern 
as in parliament, court and other political affairs. Language of administration 
is chosen largely based on political decision at national, regional and zonal 
levels. 
Language use in administration since the 1994 declaration of linguistic 
rights in the SNNPR has been shaped and reshaped based on linguistic needs 
on one hand and sociological factors, such as ethno-linguistic identity and 
language maintenance on the other (cf. Cochrane and Yeshtila 2018). We 
shall consider some of these changes in language use patterns in 
administration.  
To begin with, the language of administration in the SNNPRS was 
Amharic. On the other hand, the administrative language of Sidama Zone, 
whose administrative capital is also Hawassa like that of the SNNPRS, was 
Sidaamuafo. The different administrative language use within the same 
town, Hawassa, has been both an opportunity and challenge. It was an 
opportunity for Sidama native speakers as they could understand their 
language, institutionalize it, maintain it and use it as means of expression of 
self-identity. It has, however, been challenging for non-native speakers of 
Sidama and those who do not speak Sidaamuafo as a second language. This 
meant having to hire translators even to write an application in Sidaamuafo. 
All site maps for Hawassa town were issued with Sidaamuafo, education in 
elementary school had to be offered in Sidaamuafo and non-Sidaamuafo 
speakers had to learn without a choice of the language. The situation has 
created burden on non-native children in school and non-native adults in all 
administrative positions. Due to these challenges, the language use in 
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Hawassa has been reversed to Amharic language use. Now students have an 
option to choose either Amharic or Sidaamuafo as a medium of education, 
particularly in towns, such as Hawassa and Yirgalem.  
Following Sidama, other linguistic groups such as Wolayta, Kembata, 
Hadiyya and Gedeo became languages of administration. Since these 
languages are dominantly spoken in their respective zones, and the zones are 
largely inhabited by native speakers, the challenges that were observed in 
the Sidama Zone were less.  
Non-native speakers had the rights for translation only in courts; and in 
other administrative situations they had to pay a cost in all the zones where 
MTs are used for administration. According to the KIs, language use in 
administration has particularly been helpful in the court where many 
customers understand only the local languages, and in providing health 
education in hospitals and clinics. Judges, however, found the local 
languages partly problematic for two reasons. First, some judges do not 
understand the local language. Second, court decisions in most cases have 
to be translated to Amharic, particularly when the case has to be reported to 
the higher court.  
Despite the associated drawbacks, language use in administration has 
been preferred by native speakers for two main reasons: linguistic and in-
group identity and language maintenance. For instance, the KIs asserted that 
their language is part of their identity and that they have to use it in 
administration, education and media. In fact scholars affirm that language 
expresses social identities (Fought 2006, 21-23), “is a profound indicator of 
identity, more potent by far than cultural artifacts such as dress, food 
choices, and table manners” (Wardhaugh2006, 6),and “is among the most 
salient dimensions of group identity” (Sachdev 1995, 42). 
A few of the participants also emphasized that using their language in 
administration is a constitutional right and that they want to exercise it.  
Despite the language use rights in administration, only 10 out of 56 
ethno-linguistic groups have managed to use their language in 
administration. KIs provided several reasons for this. Some ethnolinguistic 
groups preferred Amharic as language of administration because it is all 
inclusive and accommodative. Some zones, such as Gurage had more than 
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one ethnic group; hence, it is impossible for them to use all their languages 
and had better use Amharic.  
The language use status in the SNNPRS in the three domains; MTE, 
media and administration is summarized in Table 2: 
 
Table 2. Language use status in the SNNPRS 
 
Domains of Use  No of Languages  Percentile  
Mother Tongue Education   29 53.7%  
Media  49 90%  
Administration  10 18.5%  
 
The summary table shows that 90% of ethno-linguistic groups had air 
time assigned for them for broadcasting though some of them are not using 
their mother tongue. More than half, 53% of the languages are used in 
education at different levels. The least, 18.5%, of the languages are used in 
administration.  
 
 
Language and Politics 
 
Language in politics is a kind of interface in that all language use is 
associated with political power. All decisions of language use, including 
national official language, language of wider communication (lingua 
franca), and language uses in different domains and geographical areas are 
the result of political orientations. In this section, our focus is on language 
used as marker of identity, specifically for the sake of political independence 
of different administrative levels. Several ethno-linguistic groups have made 
requests for administrative autonomy, such as a separate ethnic based 
regional government (e.g., Sidama), or a different ethnic based 
administrative zone (e.g., Konso), and separate ethnic based district (e.g., 
Dent’a and Kucha) in the SNNPRS, and only a few of them have managed 
to achieve their goal. Table 3 presents some of the independence requests 
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made by ethno-linguistic groups, the language claimed as a mark of identity, 
and the result obtained: 
 
Table 3. Language and independence request 
 
SN ‘Ethnic group’ Language  Result  
1 Silte Siltigna Became independent 
2 Wolane Wolenigna No 
3 Dent'a Kizigna No 
4 Donga Kizigna No 
5 K'ucha K'uchigna No 
6 Dorze Dorzign No 
7 Gezo Gezogna No 
8 Menja _______ No 
 
The ‘ethnic’ groups in Table 3 requested the Council of Nationalities of 
the SNNPRS. Some of them went to the Federal State’s Council of 
Nationalities when their case was declined. The context the ethnic groups 
that made the requests are as follow. 
Silte has been part of the Gurage Zone, and after fierce struggle to be 
‘Silte’ by reconstructing a separate identity, it was recognized as a different 
group and became an independent zone. Language was the main criteria 
used for being different, though there were other factors, such as being a 
Muslim, claimed to have originated from Harar, and other political factors. 
Wolane is a district in the Gurage Zone, and the people speak one of 
Guragina varieties, Wolane. Wolane still claims that its language is different, 
and deserves a different identity with aspirations of administrative 
independence. 
Dent'a is a group that lives in Hadiyya Zone. It used to consider itself 
Hadiyya, but it recently has claimed a different identity, Dent'a Dubamo. 
The people claim that they originated from Amhara region and their 
forefather was Dubale, which became Dubamo in Hadiyya. They claim that 
they originally spoke Amharic, but over time they developed their own 
language, Kizigna, a mix of Kambata and Hadiyya.  
Fekede Menuta 46 
The SNNPRS council of nationality studied their language and found 
that it was not different from the language of Hadiyya. Dissatisfied with the 
decision, the Dent'a group went to the Federal State’s Council of 
Nationalities for reconsideration of the decision made by the council of 
nationalities of the SNNPRS. The Federal Council of Nationalities made a 
study on the languages of Dent'a. It was found that ‘Dent'a language’ shared 
much lexicon with Kembata than with Hadiyya, yet the similarity among the 
three was (70%). The claimed Dent'a identity and administrative autonomy 
was denied by the Council of Nationalities of the Federal Government as 
well.  
Donga are group of people living in Kembata-Tenbaro Zone and speak 
Kembattisa, the language of Kembata. The people claimed a different 
identity, having Amhara origin, and requested independent recognition. Like 
Dent'a, they claimed that they had a language Kizigna, which is no longer 
spoken. It is not clear whether Dent'a and Donga have a similar origin, as 
they both claim Amhara origin, a similar language named Kizigna. Though 
Donga is recognized as a different group in identity, administrative 
independence was not granted. 
K'ucha, Dorze, and Gezo belong to Ometo language clusters of Omotic 
languages. All the three argued that their language variety is different and 
claimed separate administrative and ethnic autonomy. None of them were 
granted the claimed ethnic identity and the administrative autonomy.  
Of all the groups who requested independence, Menja was the only one 
that does not have its own language to claim. It speaks the Keffa language, 
Kafenono, which is spoken by Keffa people. The Menja are despised 
minorities who are largely excluded from the majority due to their food 
habits. As these groups do not have their language which identify them as 
different linguistic unit on one hand, and the dominant power of the majority 
Keffa on the other, the Menja were not recognized as independent groups 
administratively.  
In short, language has been used as a political weapon to claim in-group 
identity and administrative independence though the result in most cases was 
not positive. Currently, most Ethno-linguistic groups of the SNNPRS are 
requesting separate linguistic based regional identity. So far, Sidama, 
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Gurage, Hadiyya, Wolayta and Keffa have officially requested a separate 
regional autonomy.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Discussion 
 
The Ethiopian constitution grants each nationality the right to develop 
and use its language. This is a great opportunity because there are countries 
that limit language use rights to one or a few major languages. Now, ethno-
linguistic groups have developed self-confidence to use their language. 
However, the open-ended language use grant has been questioned by several 
authors particularly with regard to official language choice and use (cf. 
Midega 2014). 
In the Ethiopian context, once a mother tongue is in the education 
system, the Ministry of Education at the national or regional level supports 
the efforts, such as in teachers training and material development. 
Bringing 29 languages in 25 years of time into school use is a great 
success. These languages now have orthographies, textbooks, dictionaries of 
different sorts, and primers for some of them. These partly guarantee 
language development, thereby keeping the languages from endangerment. 
There were several problems to mother tongue use in education. It was 
expected that mother tongue use improves education quality; however, this 
has not been achieved (cf. Smith et al. 2012). Language use patterns in 
education have been irregular. Script choices have been based on political 
motivations rather than pedagogical advantages; it largely attempted to use 
a Latin-based script, and tried to avoid Ethiopic, which was associated with 
politically dominant groups. It was reported that Ethiopic cannot handle 
gemination, length and some sounds unique to particular languages in the 
country. Teachers recruited for mother tongue education training were those 
who could not join other programs, such as technical and vocational 
education and nursing.  
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Language use in media was relatively a success story though there is no 
equity in air time assigned, and that some ethnic groups could not use their 
mother tongue but a lingua franca.  
Language use in administration was limited to a few languages, and it 
has been evaluated both positively and negatively. On positive side, it has 
partly solved the problem of local languages speakers who do not understand 
the lingua franca of the country, Amharic. The setback is that local 
languages and/or dialects have been used with political motives with 
unintended consequences of ethnic conflicts (cf. Inglehart and Woodward 
1972 and Fishman 1972 for misuse of languages). 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Based on the finding, we recommend the following: 
 
 Based on the Ethiopian constitution’s linguistic right, a clear 
language use policy that include language status and language use 
patterns in all domains should be made available.  
 For intergroup communication, national unity, and inter-regional 
mobility, there should be a national official language. 
 There should be language use implementation strategy at national, 
regional and zonal levels.  
 The direction of mother tongue use and development patterns need 
to be fixed, and teachers’ recruitment and trainings should be 
improved. 
 Ethiopian linguistics should develop Ethiopian Phonetic Alphabet 
(EPA) and orthographic convention to solve the existing problems 
in using Ethiopic. 
 Bureaus of Tourism & Cultures, Education, and Information & 
Communication should support nationalities whose languages are 
not used institutionally to guaranty equity, access and fairness.  
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